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Abstract
This article examines how geopolitics are embedded into the efforts of Southern 
nations that try to build new climate knowledge infrastructures. It achieves this through 
an analysis of the composition of the international climate modelling basis of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), viewed from the perspective 
of the Brazilian Earth System Model (BESM) – the scientific project which placed 
a Latin  American country for the first time inside the global modelling bases of 
the IPCC. The paper argues that beyond the idea of “infrastructural globalism”, a 
historical process of global scientific cooperation led by developed countries, we 
also need to understand the “infrastructural geopolitics” of climate models. This 
concept seeks to describe the actions of developing countries towards minimizing 
the imbalance of global climate scientific production, and how these countries 
participate in global climate governance and politics. The analysis of the construction 
of BESM suggests that national investments in global climate modelling were aimed 
at attaining scientific sovereignty, which is closely related to a notion of political 
sovereignty of the nation-state within the international regime of climate change.
Keywords: Climate change knowledge, IPCC, Climate modelling, Global South.
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“Geopolítica infraestructural” del conocimiento climático: 
el Modelo Brasileño del Sistema Terrestre y la brecha de 
conocimiento norte-sur◊
Resumen
Este artículo examina cómo la geopolítica se integra en los esfuerzos de las naciones 
del sur que intentan construir nuevas infraestructuras de conocimiento sobre el 
clima. Lo logra a través de un análisis de la composición de la base internacional de 
modelos climáticos del Panel Intergubernamental sobre Cambio Climático (IPCC), 
visto desde la perspectiva del Modelo Brasileño del Sistema Terrestre (BESM), el 
proyecto científico que por primera vez colocó a un país latinoamericano en las bases 
de modelado global del IPCC. Se argumenta que, más allá de la idea del “globalismo 
infraestructural”, un proceso histórico de cooperación científica global liderado por 
países desarrollados, también necesitamos entender la “geopolítica infraestructural” 
de los modelos climáticos. Este concepto busca describir las acciones de los países 
en desarrollo para minimizar el desequilibrio de la producción científica sobre el 
clima, y cómo estos países participan en la gobernanza y política climática global. 
El análisis de la construcción de BESM sugiere que las inversiones nacionales en 
modelos climáticos globales tenían como objetivo alcanzar la soberanía científica, 
que está estrechamente relacionada con una noción de soberanía política del 
Estado-nación dentro del régimen internacional de cambio climático.
Palabras clave: Conocimiento del cambio climático, IPCC, Modelado climático, 
Sur global.
Introduction
In this paper we argue that climate knowledge infrastructures can be closely related to the geopolitical dimensions of the climate change regime. We focus on how developing and developed countries relate to 
each other in the composition of the scientific basis for the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In his comprehensive book A Vast Machine, 
Paul Edwards (2010) presents a historical account of climate science as 
a global knowledge infrastructure. Edwards emphasizes the “globalist” 
character of scientific progress, describing a process of co-evolution of 
scientific knowledge, its infrastructures and political institutions like the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the IPCC. Nevertheless, the 
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construction of a global climate knowledge infrastructure involves different 
scientific groups from different national, cultural, and socioeconomic realities. 
As Shackley (2001) points out, the “epistemic lifestyle” of climate 
scientists can vary from country to country and reflect important cultural 
and institutional dimensions. However, Shackley – like Edwards – focuses 
on the realities of Euro-American climate science groups, with this and 
related work largely overlooking the climate knowledge infrastructures 
of the so-called “global South”. A number of important questions remain 
unexplored, like what kinds of asymmetries exist between climate science 
groups in developed and developing countries, what kinds of strategies have 
been applied to overcome difficulties in the production of climate scientific 
knowledge in developing countries, and how do these different “worlds” 
of climate science relate to each other in “globalist” spaces like the IPCC?
The IPCC is the institution that sets the scientific parameters for 
international discussion on climate change; it is an intergovernmental 
agency under the United Nations Environment Programme and the WMO, 
composed of scientists from 193 member nations. The IPCC seeks to 
summarize the state of the art of the scientific understanding of climate 
change and provide informed advice to policymakers through official 
assessment reports that represents the consensus view of the leading climate 
change experts in the world (IPCC, 2013). 
However, since its beginning in 1988, critical analysis of the expertise 
mobilized in IPCC assessments has highlighted the lack of participation 
of developing country experts (Hulme; Mahony, 2010). For example, 
Kandlikar and Sagar (1999) examined the IPCC First and Second Assessment 
Reports with respect to the participation of Indian expertise and found the 
participation “heavily skewed in favour of some industrialized countries” 
(Kandlikar; Sagar, 1999, p. 134). Lahsen, in her study of Brazil and the climate 
change regime argues: “Brazilian climate scientists reflect some distrust of 
the IPCC, which they describe as dominated by Northern framings of the 
problems and therefore biased against interpretations and interests of the 
South” (Lahsen, 2004, p.161). Mahony (2014) discusses the occasionally 
antagonistic relationship between the Panel and Indian political and scientific 
communities, bringing to light something of the geopolitics of climate 
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knowledge production. These cases illustrate the agonistic coexistence of 
different “worlds” in the IPCC which can be expressed in the Global North 
and Global South framework (Joshi et al., 2013). 
The emergence of the notions of Global North and Global South can 
be traced to early political negotiations around environmental change 
and refers back to the historical trajectories of different (rich/poor, post-
imperial/post-colonial, developed/developing) parts of the world1. In this 
article, the North/South distinction will be used to emphasize asymmetries 
in climate knowledge production between geographical regions composed 
by developing and developed countries2. At the same, we attend to how 
this North/South distinction is mobilized by scientific and politics actors in 
support of different positions and courses of action. 
Investigating the case of the Brazilian Earth System Model (BESM) – the 
scientific project which placed a Latin American country for the first time 
inside the global modelling bases of IPCC – this article analyses the dynamic 
constitution of the central and peripheral dimensions of global climate 
science and interprets the asymmetries of resources and power that remain 
within the IPCC scientific network. While the notion of “infrastructural 
globalism” is important for comprehending the rise of a global knowledge-
making enterprise, it is less useful in comprehending the different realities 
of developed and developing countries and how the science produced 
by them participates in the IPCC. In this paper we seek to uncover the 
politics of climate science in the international climate change regime, and 
the geopolitics of generating climate knowledge on the “Southern” side 
of the global climate knowledge infrastructure. Beyond infrastructural 
globalism, we need to understand the “infrastructural geopolitics” of global 
climate knowledge between developing and developed nations, if we are 
1 Harding (2015) explains that the term “Global South” was invented by activists at the 1992 
United Nations environment conference in Rio de Janeiro to designate issues related to 
globalization that hide histories of colonialism and North-controlled development policies.
2 However, it is important to recognize that there is the problem that the use of these binaries 
terms overemphasizes a supposed homogeneity of each side and undervalues the hybrid, 
interactive nature of so much of the global social relations (Mac Leod, 1982). On the other 
hand, avoiding these dichotomies, there is the risk of completely diluting the central and 
peripheral dimensions and the deep asymmetries of resources and power that remain in the 
global scientific networks (Kreimer, 2016).
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to understand the asymmetries and different political perspectives involved 
in the production of global climate knowledge. 
Beyond the processes of inclusion of authors and peer-reviewers from 
developing countries in the IPCC, attention is needed to the different national 
production sites and infrastructures of the primary knowledge being assessed: 
the exclusive network of climate modelling centres that exert power over 
descriptions of future climate. Among the various methods, instruments 
and practices that are part of atmospheric science routines and climate 
policy, numerical models and advanced computational infrastructures have 
played a central role. 
Computational models are the main tools with which the atmospheric 
sciences perform meteorological forecasts and global climate studies 
(Shackley et al., 1998, Lahsen, 2005; Wynne, 1996; 2010; Edwards, 
2010). These models, often referred to as "climate models," are present in 
the daily routines of weather forecasting centres and substantially in the 
reports of important international scientific organizations such as the IPCC, 
whose reports have been the basis of discussions on international political 
agreements (Demerrit, 2001; Hulme; Mahony, 2010). Climate modelling 
has thus emerged as a fundamental organizational principle for the global 
epistemic community that surrounds climate issues (Sudenberg, 2007a; 
2007b; Duarte, 2016), also becoming a central actor in global climate 
governance regimes. A process of mutual reinforcement can be observed - 
models reinforce the authority of policymakers, and in turn, the hegemony 
of computational simulation as a way of producing knowledge about the 
global climate is secured (Shackley, 1997; Hulme, 2013).
Nevertheless, global climate models are tools developed by a small 
number of countries with the financial and technical capacity to practice 
this kind of science. Historically, the United States, Europe and Japan have 
hosted most of the climatological centres that develop global climate models 
(Edwards, 2010). It is also these countries that are largely responsible for 
producing the simulations that define the emission scenarios for IPCC 
Working Group 13. Therefore, IPCC climate futures have been largely defined 
3 Considered the “science group”, the group of earth and natural sciences that construct the 
basis of the IPCC report.
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by the climate science produced by countries of the “Global North”. Only 
recently have Global South countries begun to address this imbalance, with 
Brazil having a privileged position through investing in larger-scale scientific 
infrastructure for climate research4. 
To discuss the geopolitical implications of “Global South” climate 
modelling infrastructures, this paper analyses the history of the Brazilian 
Earth System Model (BESM). From the perspective of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) we show how BESM is shaped by political, institutional, 
cultural and material elements, having also become important to how Brazil 
has positioned itself in the global geopolitics of climate change. Through 
describing the local conditions and negotiations of the climate modelling 
group BESM, we analyse how the “elite” world of global climate simulation 
is composed and how this is perceived by Southern modelers and leading 
climate science researchers in Brazil. 
This paper is based on four years of fieldwork (between 2013 and 2016) 
on the organization of meteorology in Brazil and the history of numerical 
weather prediction (Miguel, 2017). This included conducting twenty-nine 
interviews with key informants of the Brazilian National Institute for Space 
Research (INPE) – the main institution of climate modelling development 
in the country – and attending scientific events in the area of climate 
modelling and climate change in Brazil.  In addition, relevant documents 
and news media were collected and analysed. The empirical material was 
subject to interpretive content analysis drawing on the tools of grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2006).
4 It should be mentioned that this article is published at a transition towards potentially 
much less influence of Brazilian science in the IPCC and the global governance of climate 
and environment. Due to severe budget cuts in science funding (Angelo, 2019); a national 
agenda that is explicitly averse to global environmental regimes and is reverting Brazil’s 
leadership in that realm (Abessa; Famá; Buruaem, 2019); and also an ideologically charged 
foreign policy which equates global institutions and climate change to “a Marxist plot” 
(Watts, 2018). The recent institutionalizing of the distorted idea of globalism as equal to 
leftist conspiracy against Brazil promises to potentially shift the country to a very different 
position in the global climate regimes in the next years.
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The geopolitical dimensions of climate knowledge 
infrastructures
Knowledge infrastructures increasingly are used in politics, and 
this can also be seen on a global scale, as the example of global climate 
governance makes clear. Understanding how such infrastructures participate 
in global fluxes of politics and power demands a conceptualization of how 
infrastructures are then a part of geopolitics, especially as such infrastructures 
are permeated by asymmetries related to who owns which capacities, 
and thus who can speak on climate in different ways. Conceptualizing 
climate geopolitics thus should include a reflection on how technological 
infrastructures not only become conditioned by such politics: they are also 
part of what makes these geopolitics possible in the first place, having a role 
in defining and sustaining power imbalances. Therefore, actions and disputes 
in and around the building and maintenance of such infrastructures are 
important to understanding global geopolitical dimensions of both climate 
governance and knowledge infrastructures. 
STS has shown that infrastructures, more than a collection of artifacts or 
a “technology”, should be thought of as a system of objects and relationships 
between technologies, people and material objects. Infrastructures are thus 
entwined with cultural habits, with social and economic organizations, 
with professional and personal identities, and so on (Jackson et al., 2007; 
Jensen; Winthereik, 2013). Andrew Barry (2013) suggests that infrastructures, 
material artefacts, and physical systems are objects and environments 
that should be understood as integral to the conduct of state politics and 
international relations.  According to him, material objects and infrastructures 
never exist in isolation, but are themselves “evolving entities” that form 
part of a constellation of dynamic social relations. He emphasizes that 
building infrastructures is a way of maintaining or transforming certain 
power relationships. Infrastructures can therefore be interpreted as “political 
machines” (Barry, 2013), situated within different arrangements of power 
and authority. 
The climate change regime is a complex arrangement of power and 
authority that links the microsocial contexts in which knowledge about the 
environment is produced (in scientific laboratories, field experiments, and 
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climate modelling centres) with the macropolitical and economic institutions 
that shape social and environmental change on a global scale (Miller; 
Edwards, 2001). Climate knowledge infrastructures have been historically 
deeply involved in national and international political contexts. Formalized 
systems for observing and predicting weather and climate originated in 
the national weather services of the nineteenth century, largely to support 
military operations (Fleming, 2016). Initially, national weather services 
were operated as largely separate systems, but soon their data reporting 
became linked through coordinated international networks, a process that 
Paul Edwards (2006) calls “voluntaristic internationalism”. Cooperation 
and coordination were there for those who wanted it, but there was no 
compulsion for countries to participate. 
This changed in the immediate post-war period, when the WMO 
emerged as a force to bind countries into global cooperation. Edwards 
(2010, p. 18) argues that the “building of technical systems for gathering 
global data helped to create global institutions and ways of thinking globally”. 
Post-war infrastructural globalism in meteorology and related sciences was 
a key agent of both technical and cultural globalization. He offers the image 
of “a vast machine” to refer to the global knowledge infrastructure which 
emerged in climate science – a planet-girdling network of instruments, 
satellites, data connections, code and computational models which offered 
a radically new way of picturing and comprehending global systems and, 
crucially, global change. The “infrastructural globalism” of meteorology and 
climate science undergirds global intergovernmental organizations such as 
the WMO and the IPCC, a process that interlinks scientific and political 
affairs in an unprecedented process of international cooperation. 
This “infrastructural globalism” is a key site where science and politics 
are co-produced. Clark Miller (2001) shows how the ability of scientists to 
produce knowledge about global-scale natural phenomena has rested on 
their ability to shape appropriate political as well as scientific institutions. 
Governments had to be persuaded to provide the necessary resources 
to construct, maintain, and operate the meteorological network. Miller 
emphasizes that “meteorologists needed to convince sceptical governments 
and publics that scientific and technical cooperation of the form they offered 
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would bring benefits beyond scientific knowledge for its own sake” (Miller, 
2001, p. 169). The formation of scientific spaces can only be achieved by 
connecting them with national and international affairs. 
A key question is how different scientific groups act to connect science 
and policy in different national contexts, and how these connections add up 
to create a global infrastructure. Elzinga (1993) suggests that, in international 
environmental affairs (like climate change), science is frequently “politics by 
other means”. Analysing the emergence of global environmental research 
programs, he emphasizes that the desires of national scientific groups to 
be part of the agendas of international scientific programs can only be 
fulfilled through trade-offs with national political groups. On the one hand, 
research groups receive public funds to develop their research; on the 
other, by conducting their research and gradually obtaining international 
scientific recognition, scientific groups carry out a political task through 
science which allows advancing the international interests of geopolitical 
arenas. Elzinga (1993) clarifies that such a correlation between science and 
geopolitics is possible because scientific research has two types of values 
that are associated: a) the “practical instrumental” – related to the ability to 
solve concrete problems through the application of scientific knowledge; 
and b) the “symbolic instrumental” – related to the emblem of scientific 
capacity as a symbol of power, social advancement and development. With 
these two modes of power, scientific knowledge is an effective means of 
meeting national objectives and geopolitical goals in international arenas.
Through the operation of global climate knowledge infrastructures 
and networks such as the IPCC, climate change is framed in relation to 
specific questions of political economy, and in ways which pose questions 
of how nation-states can respond and adapt to climate change as matters 
of security and sovereignty (O'Lear; Dalby, 2015). Considered one of the 
main scientific resources to guide plans of climate change adaptation, 
climate modelling offers a power of calculation and a capacity to predict 
the imbrications of climate and national territories in the future (Mahony; 
Hulme, 2012; Mahony, 2014). As political machines, climate models exercise 
both practical and symbolic power in the construction of what political 
geographers have described as a new form of ‘geo-metrics’ (Elden, 2013; 
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Dalby, 2013): those “calculative strategies turned towards land, terrain and 
territory”, albeit at increasingly global or even post-national scales, which 
offer to political actors important glimpses into the future, and “means of 
comprehending and compelling, organizing and ordering” (Elden, 2013, p. 
49). As Dalby (2013, p. 40) points out, as climate change “becomes a more 
high-profile concern for global governance, the crucial measurements of 
the earth, its geometrics, are key to geopolitical considerations.”  Attending 
to how climate models are constructed and used by different national 
scientific groups, and how they are interlinked with geopolitics, is a topic 
that nonetheless remains largely underexplored.
Global climate modelling groups between North and South
Numerical modelling of Earth’s climate is a science that has evolved 
since the 1950s and has been boosted by different technical developments, 
including more powerful calculation methods and the growth of the weather 
observation infrastructure. General Circulation Models (GCM) simulate the 
behaviour of the climate system by dividing earth into three-dimensional 
grids and using supercomputers to solve mathematical equations which 
represent exchanges of matter and energy between the grid points. Based 
on GCMs, climate scientists increasingly represented the Earth’s climate 
as an integrated global system, to be known through new geometrics like 
the global average temperature (Shackley; Wynne, 1996; Lahsen, 2005; 
Edwards, 2010; Hulme, 2010). 
In the 1980s, climate modelling technology moved in the direction 
of increasing the complexity of numerical representations of the Earth 
system. Modelers recognized that the transfer of energy between oceans 
and atmosphere plays an extremely significant role in both weather and 
climate. For this reason, they started to couple models of the general ocean 
circulation with the global atmospheric models, creating the first versions 
of “Earth System Models”. Gradually, modelers began to couple other 
climate-related systems to the ocean-atmosphere, such as the land surface, 
the cryosphere (glaciers, sea ice, and snow cover), the hydrosphere (lakes, 
rivers, evaporation, and rainfall), and vegetation. Today, Earth System Models 
are the most complex instruments for long term climate projection, and 
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they have become central tools to produce future projections of climate 
change impacts (Harper, 2008; Weart, 2010; Edwards, 2010). 
Since its beginning in 1988, the IPCC derived much of its understanding 
of climate from the work of climate modelers. To serve the IPCC assessment 
process modelers initiated a number of exercises in model evaluation, the 
most important of these exercises being model intercomparison. Model 
intercomparison exercises require each modelling group to run its model 
using a specific set of parameters (monthly average sea surface temperature, 
sea ice distribution etc.) to provide specific output variables in a standard 
format, thus creating a basis for intercomparing model performance and 
diagnosing the sources of differences in model behaviour (Meelh et al., 
2000). Today, the most important model intercomparison project linked to 
the IPCC is the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), organized 
under the umbrella of the World Climate Research Program (WCRP)5. 
The objective of the CMIP is to produce model experiments to simulate 
“past, present and future climate changes arising from natural, unforced 
variability or in response to changes in radiative forcing in a multi-model 
context”6. This understanding includes assessments of model performance 
during the historical period and quantifications of the causes of the spread 
in future projections.  Keeping up with the “state of the art” of earth system 
modelling requires continuous investment in an infrastructure of advanced 
supercomputers and human capacity. 
Only a few climate modelling groups have the necessary infrastructures 
to execute global climate modelling experiments and participate in the 
CMIP. As Edwards (2010, p.172) points out, “just 33 groups submitted 
GCMs for the Atmospheric Model Intercomparison Project” (AMIP)7 in the 
5 The WCRP was established in 1980 under the joint sponsorship of the International 
Council for Science (ICSU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). In 1993 the 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO also became a sponsor. 
The main objectives of WCRP, defined at its inception and still valid today, are to determine 
the predictability of climate the effects of human activities on climate. See: https://www.
wcrp-climate.org/wgcm-cmip. 
6 See the main program description in the website of CMIP: https://www.wcrp-climate.org/
wgcm-cmip.
7 AMIP was the first model intercomparison project, which had less computer-intensive 
experiments and used atmospheric global circulation models with smaller complexity than 
the Earth System Models (Edwards, 2010, p. 171).
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1990’s; a few years later, “only about 18 groups with Atmosphere-Ocean 
Coupled General Circulation Models [the first version of Earth System 
Models] submitted outputs to CMIP – reflecting the greater complexity and 
larger computational requirements of coupled models”. Importantly, CMIP 
simulations came from the historical leaders in climate modelling: Europe, 
Japan and USA – and still did not include members from Global South. This 
only changed in 2013 – when Brazil and China made their contributions. 
On the exclusivity of CMIP, Edwards points out:
In the political arena, this fact contributes to a widespread perception that 
the issue of climate change “belongs” to the developed countries, not only 
because they are the initial (and still principal) sources of fossil fuel emissions 
but also because they are the “owners” of knowledge about the problem 
(Edwards, 2010, p.171).
The elite world of global climate simulation persists because the entry 
barriers to the ‘club’ are very high. To participate, climate modelling groups 
need to have the most advanced supercomputing infrastructures8, expert 
teams in modelling and large financial support to maintain these highly 
expensive systems. In addition, the modelling teams need to be prepared 
to develop climate models and improve them according to the standards 
set by CMIP’s leading members. These kinds of infrastructural conditions 
carry a high financial cost to countries in the Global South. 
Nevertheless, in the last phase of CMIP9 –the Fifth IPCC Report – for 
the first time a Latin American country introduced global climate modelling 
outputs into the CMIP. These outputs were produced by Brazilian modelers 
of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) involved in the national 
project of developing the Brazilian Earth System Model (BESM). As we 
can see in the following table, Brazil figures between the other selected 
modelling groups as a participant in CMIP Phase 5.
8 In 2015, the ten most powerful supercomputers in the world were in China (1st place), 
United States (2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th and 10th place), Japan (4th place), Switzerland (7th place), 
Germany 8th place) and Saudi Arabia (9th place). But in several positions on the list, there 
is a massive presence of the United States with 193 supercomputers installed in the country. 
Source: http://www.top500.org/lists/2015/11/.
9 The CMIP performed five phases of modelling experiments related to the production of 
the five IPCC reports, respectively, in the years 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2013. See: http://
cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/index.html.
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Table 1: Countries, Climate Centres and Climate Models participants of CMIP5
Countries Climate Centers Climate Models
Australia CSIRO-BOM ACCESS 1.0, 1.3
China BCC BCC-CSM 1.1, 1.1 (m)
China GCESS BNU-ESM
Canada CCCMA CanESM2,CanCM4, CanAM4
USA DOE-NSF-NCAR CCSM4, CESM1 (BGC), (CAM5), (CAM5.1, FV2), 
(FASTCHEM), (WACCM)
USA RSMAS CCSM4(RSMAS)
Italy CMCC CMCC, CESM, CM, CMS
France CNRM/CERFACS CNRM-CM%
Australia CSIRO/QCCCE CSIRO-Mk3.6.0
Europe EC-EARTH EC-EARTH
China LASG-IAP & LASG-CESS FGOALS – g2, s2, gl
China FIO FIO-ESM
USA NASA/GMAO GEOS-5
USA NOAA/GFDL GFDL – HIRAM-C360, HIRAM-C180, CM2.1, CM3, 
ESM2G, ESM2M
USA NASA/GISS GISS E2-H, E2-H-CC, E2-R, E2-R-CC, E2CS-H, E2CS-R
UK MOHC Had – CM3, CM3Q, GEM2-ES, GEM2-A, GEM2-CC
Korea/UK NMR/KMA HadGEM2-AO
Russia INM INM-CM4
France IPSL IPSL – CM5A-LR, CM5A-MR, CM5B-LR
Japan MIROC MIROC – 5,3 m, 4 h, ESM, ESM-CHEM
Germany MPI-M MPI-ESM – HR, LR, P, ESM-P
Japan MRI MRI – AGCM3, 2H, AGCM3.2S, CGCM3, ESM1
Norway NCC NorESM1-M, NorESM-ME
USA NCEP CFSv2-2011
Japan NICAM NICAM-09
Brazil INPE BESM OA2.3
Source: Taylor, 2012.
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As table 1 makes clear, most of CIMP5´s participating climatological 
centres are North American, European or wealthy Asian nations as Japan 
and South Korea. Brazil and China are exceptions from the ‘South’. It should 
be noted (in the third column) that the United States participated with 
output from twenty-two models, which denotes a high climate modelling 
capability and a larger volume of simulations included in the CMIP5 database 
compared to other countries10. 
It is important noting that the scientific questions and the criteria 
adopted by the CMIP are defined by its organizing committee composed of 
seven members from North American and European meteorological centres, 
the USA, France, Germany and the UK (Eyring et al., 2016). Activities for 
future CMIPs have been reconfigured, aiming to conduct experiments at 
even more advanced stages of global modelling (Eyring et al., 2016). The 
required advances make the relationship between climatological centres 
in this project increasingly hierarchical as the new advances are produced 
by the most advanced modelling centres in the North, while Southern 
Hemisphere countries remain mostly absent from these decision-making 
structures. 
Global climate modelling practice occurs in specific sites of climate 
knowledge production. The “global” character of these international projects 
masks the unequal division of labour between North and South in the 
international climate science system. As a Brazilian climate modeler pointed 
out,
the developed climate centres develop the scientific guidelines, questions and 
requirements for the CMIP project and produce the most important results 
and countries with less capacity as Brazil participate with a few simulations 
that are included in the final report (quoted in Miguel, 2017, p. 180)
In that sense, global climate modelling practice reflects the severe 
imbalance between developed and developing countries in the generation 
of scientific knowledge in environmental science (Karlsson; Srebotnjak; 
10 Although countries like China and France have acquired powerful supercomputers and 
applied this computing power to climatology, the USA still leads the field, having the largest 
number of researchers, the most powerful calculation capabilities, and the best research 
centers.
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Gonzales, 2007). However, what does this “imbalance” mean to the political 
stances of Global South nations, and how do scientific groups react to IPCC 
asymmetries? To explore these questions, we now describe the “infrastructural 
geopolitics” of the Brazilian Earth system modelling project.  
The Brazilian way to the IPCC global modelling club
To understand how Brazilian climate scientists from the scientific 
“periphery” were able to integrate the highest level of IPCC modelling 
experiments with BESM, we need to consider the local conditions and 
historical evolution of climate modelling science in Brazil. Climate modelling 
started in Brazil in 1994 with the creation of the Centre for Weather 
Forecasting and Climate Studies (CPTEC) in the Brazilian National Institute 
for Space Research (INPE). To start the numerical predictions in CPTEC, 
the local government first imported a global climate model from a North 
American climate centre, “COLA” (The Centre for Ocean-Land-Atmosphere 
Studies). Gradually the CPTEC team improved on the model with new 
components that represented the climate system that governs the weather in 
South America. Making these improvements was not easy: lack of financial 
resources and the absence of modelling experts were some of the problems 
faced by Brazilians at the time. But despite all these difficulties, the team 
managed to start operational numerical weather prediction in Brazil (Miguel; 
Escada; Monteiro, 2016).  
Significant transformations occurred in climate science in general and 
in the climate modelling field in Brazil after the year 2007. The national 
economic and political situation and the publication of the IPCC AR4 
in 2007 pushed for a process of institutionalization of climate change 
policy, which in turn restructured climate science networks in Brazil11. 
The Lula presidency (2003-2011) was a particularly favourable political 
and economic moment for Brazilian science, with rising investments and 
11 After the IPCC/AR4 – which declared that the “warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal” (IPCC, 2007, p. 30) – the Brazilian government and funding bodies responded 
with a fast process of institutionalization of climate change policy and by forming climate 
change scientific networks like “Rede Clima” (Brazilian Climate Change Research Network), 
“INCT – Mudanças Climáticas” (National Institute for Climate Change Science) and 
“Programa FAPESP Mudanças Climáticas” (The Program of São Paulo Science Foundation 
for Climate Change) (Miguel, Escada and Monteiro, 2017).
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expanding infrastructure in science and technology (Petherick, 2010). There 
was widespread optimism with what was considered a long-awaited “take 
off”12, with expectations that the country would become the fifth-largest 
economy in the world and would occupy a more relevant role in the world 
stage. Investment in science and technology grew in strategic areas like oil 
and energy, but also in sciences for diplomatic and environmental issues like 
remote sensing in Amazonia – to reduce the rates of Amazon deforestation 
– and climate change studies – to inform the government and the Brazilian 
delegation to plan the participation of Brazil in the United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Copenhagen, 
2009 – (Monteiro, 2014, 2015; Monteiro and Rajão, 2017; Miguel, 2017). 
The political momentum created the opportunity for climate modelers of 
CPTEC to launch the scientific project of an Earth System Model.
The Brazilian Earth System Model project started in 2008, when the 
Centre for Earth System Science (CCST) associated to CPTEC, at INPE, 
was created. The project was coordinated by some of the leading climate 
science researchers in Brazil – including some Brazilian members of IPCC. 
The project was supported by the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (MCTI) and the main national science funding agencies like São 
Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) 
and National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq). 
The volume of funding – compared to other projects supported by the same 
agencies – represented the largest amount of public investment ever awarded 
to a single project in climate change research in Brazil (Miguel, 2017). 
After 2007, the interest in climate change simulations grew between 
decision makers in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, 
and Environment. Scientific information about climate change impacts 
was considered the most important scientific resource for advancing the 
goals set by the national policy on climate change and for formulating the 
national plan for adaptation to climate change. In the National Policy on 
Climate Change it is stated that:
When we consider the issue of climate change in Brazil, we face the problem 
of the lack of reliable scenarios of the possible future of the climate in the 
12 See: http://www.economist.com/node/14845197.
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country, which has great proportions [...]. In order to elaborate these studies, 
however, there is a need for the development of long-term climate change 
models with appropriate spatial resolution for regional analysis, which will 
create the conditions for the development of scenarios of possible future climate 
change with different concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
and to analyse the impacts of global climate change in Brazil. [...] With these 
results, the country will be better able to identify the most vulnerable regions 
and sectors with a higher degree of reliability than offered by the IPCC´s global 
models, and to develop specific adaptation projects with the appropriate 
scientific basis, enabling a more rational allocation of public resources. (Brasil, 
2007, p. 84-87, translation by the author)
This notion that by knowing possible climate change scenarios the 
country would be better prepared to identify more vulnerable regions was 
widespread among policy makers. Trust in the science of modelling justified 
the large investments made in BESM. In this regard, one of the statements 
of the secretary of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Presidency (SAE) 
was illustrative: “with the BESM project, INPE’s modelers are putting a 
‘magnifying glass’ over the Brazilian territory to identify climate change 
impacts”13 (quoted in Miguel, 2017, p.146).
This “practical instrumental” value (Elzinga, 1993) of climate modelling 
that attracts decision makers was used by BESM modelers as a rhetorical 
resource that legitimized modelling practice. The modelers also affirmed 
that “we need to represent aspects of the regional nature that influence 
climate dynamics in South America so we will produce more reliable climate 
change scenarios for Brazil”, and “with the BESM model, we can anticipate 
extreme weather events which mainly affect the poorest populations" 
(Miguel, 2017, p.145). This rhetoric of scientific predictive power was used 
powerfully in the public communication of the BESM project to legitimize 
the huge investments in modelling technology.   
Furthermore, the actors involved in the BESM defended the project 
as an emblem of national scientific capacity with a “symbolic instrumental 
value” (Elzinga, 1993): a symbol of national scientific power. Echoing 
Dalby’s (2013) comments about the centrality of climate geometrics to 
13 This is declared by the secretary of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Presidency (SAE) 
in a public interview in 2014 when he announced the investment of two million Reais in the 
BESM model (Miguel, 2017, p.150).
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climate geopolitics, it was stated that “Brazil needs to have autonomy in 
the production of climate future simulations to advise with sovereignty the 
decision making in climate change issues” (BESM – Coordinator) (Miguel, 
2017, p. 181). As other case studies have shown (Lahsen, 2002; Mahony, 
2014), the pragmatic role of climate modelling is often associated with the 
discursive construction of the nation-state’s capability to manage its own 
issues related to the impacts of climate change within its territorial domain 
(see also Whitehead et al., 2007). Climate modelling is considered a strategic 
resource which sovereign countries should not fail to develop through their 
own, endogenous scientific capabilities. Indeed, the shaping of BESM was 
closely related to an articulation of Brazil exercising its own epistemic (and 
thus political) sovereignty on climate change issues.
The scientific community gathered in the BESM project was able to 
associate the objectives of the project with the nationalist appeal of Lula’s 
government. They named the project “Brazilian Earth System Model”, with 
the evident intention to emphasize that this type of technology was being 
developed autonomously by a team of national researchers. Just as then 
president Lula frequently used the phrase “never before in the history of 
our country”14 to highlight the exceptional character of his government, 
BESM modelers used the slogan “Brazilian Climate Model, for the first time 
at the IPCC” as an emblem of Brazil’s then growing scientific power. The 
alignment of these discourses reinforced the legitimacy of the BESM group 
and enabled it to acquire more public funding and become the central 
scientific project for climate change in Brazil in that period.
In 2010, the Brazilian government acquired one of the most powerful 
supercomputers available at the time with the purpose of improving weather 
forecasting and climate change simulations. This expensive infrastructure 
was installed at the CPTEC/INPE and was celebrated as a milestone in 
Brazilian climate science. Named “Tupã” – after a native South American 
god of thunder – the supercomputer Cray XT6 boosted new advances in 
climate and Earth system modelling. With this new infrastructure, the BESM 
14 President Lula was known for his emblematic phrases that emphasized the exceptional 
character of his government. "Never before in the history of our country" during the former 
president's government was used in many instances as an emblem of sovereignty and 
national development.
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group started the experiments for the CMIP5. The new supercomputer 
infrastructure and the campaign for global climate modelling in Brazil 
were internationally recognized as a national scientific achievement. In an 
emblematic Nature article, it was declared that with the supercomputer 
Tupã, “Brazil’s Climate Modelers are set to go global” (Tollefson, 2010). 
The author stated that “the new supercomputer could help to earn Brazil a 
place in the small club of nations that contributes global climate modelling 
expertise to the IPCC” (Tollefson, 2010, p.01)
However, the experiments with the BESM model did not materialize 
easily. Despite the availability of the supercomputer infrastructure, the 
group did not have enough climate modelling experts to conduct the CMIP 
experiments. It was necessary to organize international workshops to attract 
young researchers from other countries (India, South Africa and China) to 
participate in the project (Miguel, 2017). Also, to complete the modelling 
team, Brazilian researchers who were conducting their professional careers 
in the USA were “repatriated”. As the BESM’s coordinators stated: “one 
thing that was very clear is that without specialized manpower in climate 
modelling, there would be no Brazilian modelling at CMIP5” (Miguel, 
2017, p. 181). 
Expectations surrounding BESM – that it would contribute to the 
IPCC – put pressure on the climate modelling group. Millions invested in 
the computer program needed to be justified by results. However, one 
important condition for participating in the CMIP5 was that the results of the 
modelling experiments needed to be published in high-impact international 
scientific journals. Therefore, the group of Brazilian modelers directed all 
their efforts to conduct model simulations encompassing the time period 
from 1960 to 2105 – following the phase 5 of the CMIP protocol15. These 
experiments occurred just in time to include the outputs in the CMIP5 basis. 
The results were submitted and subsequently published in the Journal of 
Climate of the American Meteorological Society (Nobre et al., 2013) – a 
journal coordinated by some of the leading North American scientists of 
CMIP – allowing Brazil to be officially included in the IPCC5 modelling basis.
15 See: http://cmip-pcmdi.llnl.gov/cmip5/
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Once the results of BESM were admitted to the CMIP5, this milestone 
was celebrated as a major achievement of national science in some of the 
main vehicles of the Brazilian media. Major national newspapers reported 
in 2013 that for the first time Brazil "will have a climate model at the United 
Nations", that such a model "is the first to have IPCC endorsement in Latin 
America" to “simulate the climate around the world” (Escobar, 2015). This 
“national pride” expressed a desire to see Brazil strengthen its national 
expertise in the climate change area. The global climate model therefore 
became an emblem of scientific capacity. In the next section, we discuss 
the geopolitical meaning of this kind of scientific achievement considering 
the North-South divide of IPCC composition.
The infrastructural geopolitics of climate knowledge
Regarding climate knowledge infrastructures as only “machines to build” 
implies a downplaying of the importance of social, institutional, cultural, 
political and other non-technical problems that their builders always face. 
And when we talk about the global knowledge infrastructures like those 
that coalesce in the IPCC, the asymmetries between scientific groups and 
their particular intentions in the IPCC are obliterated under terms like 
“international scientific cooperation” or “global scientific effort”16.
Nevertheless, the North-South division of labour in the IPCC is 
significant, framing and shaping climate change knowledge. Despite 
increasing attention paid by the IPCC’s governing bureau to the participation 
of authors and reviewers from developing countries in the assessment 
process, the percentage of both authors and reviewers from Global South 
nations has remained small in all IPCC reports (See figure 1). 
16 The terms are often applied by the media, by scientists and appear in the IPCC's reports to 
enforce the global character of the panel's climate knowledge.
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Figure 1: Geography of IPCC expertise.
Source: SciencePO MediaLab (2016)17
The consequences of a geographical bias in IPCC expertise has been 
discussed extensively as a problem affecting the legitimacy of the assessment 
reports (Kandlikar; Sagar, 1999; Lahsen, 2004; Wynne, 1996; 2010; Hulme; 
Mahony, 2010; Mahony, 2014). Lahsen (2004) pointed out that Brazilian 
leaders involved with international climate negotiations and members of 
the scientific community were concerned to build national expertise in 
climate research in order to defend the ‘national interest’. 
The BESM project reflects this concern about the imbalances in the 
production of IPCC knowledge. Brazilian scientist and IPCC vice-president 
Thelma Krug illustrated this concern when she declared that less developed 
17 See: http://www.medialab.sciences-po.fr/ipcc/ .
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nations such as Brazil “cannot fail to have a supercomputer and climate 
modelling infrastructure” (Angelo, 2015, p. 2, our translation). In her view 
it is not enough for developing countries to have IPCC chair nominations; 
just as important is to have the capacity to produce physical and natural 
scientific knowledge of climate change. Krug said that she discussed with 
members of the IPCC presidency about inequalities and they argued that 
“developing countries do not have the installed capacity to work with 
global and regional climate models. We cannot simply put these people 
[researchers from these countries] just to make numbers and geographical 
balance in the IPCC” (Angelo, 2015, s/p). Indeed, including researchers 
with different nationalities does not necessarily translate into inequality 
reduction in the IPCC’s production of climate knowledge (Lahsen, 2007). 
The difficulties encountered in producing climate-environmental 
knowledge in emerging countries such as the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) led these countries to agree on scientific 
cooperation in environmental research. In 2014, the BRICS summit was 
held in Brazil. On that occasion, the coordinator of BESM, the Brazilian 
climatologist Carlos Nobre – at the time, also secretary of the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation – declared in the workshop on scientific 
cooperation that the generation of researchers of which he is part “was 
formed in a time of science production which everything passed through 
the USA and Europe”18. Nobre emphasized that “we, from developing 
countries, always looked to the North for scientific cooperation,” but now 
we are aware that “the world is not only composed of one hemisphere and 
the BRICS nations clearly show other arrangements, which are essential for 
the sustainable development of the planet as a whole”19. The workshop 
ended with the formulation and approval of a document establishing BRICS 
cooperation in the areas of oceanographic research, climate modelling, 
and prevention of natural disasters. It is therefore a process of scientific 
cooperation that seeks to produce new geopolitical arrangements for 
scientific exchange, apart from those through which such scientists may have 
historically cooperated with the North. In these new geopolitical-scientific 
18 See:http://www.mct.gov.br/index.php/content/view/354425/Brics_trocam_ideias_em_
mudancas_climaticas_e_prevencao_de_desastres.html.
19 Idem note 18.
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alignments that the BRICS countries intended to construct, some specific 
knowledge areas were selected to achieve such objectives, including climate 
modelling, which figured prominently as a strategic field. 
One month before the BRICS workshop in Brazil, the BESM model 
was presented in China to join efforts among modelling teams from the 
South. Like Brazil, China, in the international arena, participates in the 
negotiations on climate change with a strong geo-strategic initiative, seeking 
to strengthen cooperation with other countries for financing, technology 
transfer and capacity-building for adaptation (Moreira; Ribeiro, 2016). 
Climate modelling appears in these relations as a strategic scientific field, 
one of the areas of scientific cooperation on which countries in the South 
should focus if they want to acquire greater instrumental and symbolic 
power in global environmental arenas.
Similarly, the recent history of climate science in India is expressive of 
the geopolitical power of climate modelling in the context of a North-South 
divide. The coproduction of climate modelling and climate-political order 
in India demonstrates the “agonistic coexistence” of different strategies of 
reproducing the nation state in the putative global space of international 
climate science and politics. The development of climate modelling science 
has likewise been framed as a matter of national sovereignty, without which 
it is impossible to enter the political fray on an equal footing with northern 
countries. However, beneath the rhetoric of sovereignty lies something 
deeper – around the time of the Copenhagen negotiations, the symbolic 
power of climate models was utilized by the Indian environment minister 
as significantly in the domestic as in the international sphere – new Indian 
climate modelling facilitated the Minister’s moves to bring India closer to 
the US in terms of advocating voluntarist and market-based mitigation 
mechanisms. As some critics saw Indian territorial sovereignty being ceded, 
the discursive emphasis on epistemic sovereignty was an important political 
move.
Our analysis of the BESM case likewise illustrates that global climate 
knowledge production is a process that should be understood as composing 
an “infrastructural geopolitics”, involving unequal relations of power that 
permeate the Global North/South divide. These relationships are conditioned 
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by access to infrastructure for the production of climate knowledge, and 
thus the arenas for politics go beyond those usually analysed as such (i.e. 
the UN and global political fora), including scientific institutions and how 
they factor into international relations. The uneven geographies of global 
climate modelling, and the striving for scientific autonomy among both 
policymakers and BESM's modelling team, indicate the existence of a process 
that forces us to rethink our historical understanding of the infrastructural 
globalism of the climate sciences (Edwards, 2010). 
Edwards (2010) points out that the climate sciences have made an 
unprecedented effort in international scientific coordination to share 
information and develop a comprehensive infrastructure of global 
climate knowledge. However, his analysis focuses on the development 
of climatological infrastructures mainly in the USA and in Europe. The 
Brazilian case of BESM brings to light something different: the condition of 
inequality in the production and national control of these infrastructures, 
and the geopolitical effects of this inequality. With climate geopolitics 
increasingly organized around knowledge emerging from the observations 
and simulations of the climate science community, understanding the 
instrumental and symbolic power of these epistemic constructs is crucial. 
Building knowledge infrastructures is an increasingly prominent means of 
engaging in geopolitics.20 
The “globalist” process of climate science, which sought to cross political 
boundaries and establish a global epistemic community, has nuances that 
reveal different agendas and conflicts between epistemic groups in developed 
and developing countries (Lahsen, 2004; Miller, 2004; Jankovic, 2004; 
Mahony, 2014). The case of Brazilian climate modelling exemplifies the 
infrastructural geopolitics of climate knowledge, managed by a scientific 
group from an emerging country that traditionally took positions in the 
climate negotiations as a leader of developing countries with a strong 
"sovereignty" discourse (Viola, 2002; Viola; Franchini, 2013). The BESM 
shows the concern of a Global South nation to build national expertise in 
20 With recent developments in the US, we might also note how destroying or protecting 
knowledge infrastructures has also become a mode of geopolitics. See Walker et al., 2018.
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climate research in order to defend the “national interest”; to develop a 
political machine with which global power relations could be reshaped.
Conclusions
The history of climate science and the IPCC demonstrates that 
new constructions of natural and social order on global scales are highly 
interdependent (Miller, 2004).  The IPCC’s role in this co-production has 
depended on its ability to construct itself as a legitimate institution of global 
cooperation. 
In this article, we have argued that some Brazilian climate modelers, as 
developing country researchers, express a common Global South concern 
over the privilege of a form of climate science that is based nearly exclusively 
on the work of laboratories and modelling centres in the Global North. 
When analysing the BESM group, we perceive that national investments in 
global modelling aim to achieve a condition of scientific sovereignty that is 
tightly coupled to a notion of political sovereignty of the nation-state in the 
international climate change regime. In this way, scientific knowledge and 
its infrastructures are deeply imbricated in the geopolitics of climate change. 
These are processes that we have called the infrastructural geopolitics of 
climate knowledge. 
This analysis, we realise, is based on a project which was linked to a 
particular political project, very different from the one now in power in Brazil. 
As Bolsonaro’s agenda for environmental policy, climate change policy and 
science and technology unfold and become clearer, the previous initiatives 
to achieve scientific autonomy in climate science linked to increasing 
spending in large-scale modelling infrastructures seems to be a thing of the 
past. Current policies seem to be aimed at changing Brazil’s discourse on 
environmental protection and deforestation, shifting from a decades-long 
effort to build a leading position on global environmental governance to a 
new stance that critiques environmental protection as leftist rhetoric and 
values economic growth through farming and cattle, at the expense of 
increasing deforestation rates. Further research would be needed in order 
to fully assess how these shifts will change Brazil’s current geopolitical 
position in global climate governance mechanisms.
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The infrastructural globalism of climate science can be much better 
understood if we take into consideration the asymmetries and conservative 
aspects of international scientific networks and how they are linked to 
geopolitical questions. In this sense, it is necessary to discuss in a more 
direct way the science and technology policies that are implicit in the IPCC, 
putting in focus the knowledge that is privileged in its Working Groups and 
who produces them. In a period of apparent fragmentation of the global 
climate regime, and of the renewed assertion of nation-state territoriality 
in relation ‘global’ issues, it is more important than ever to understand how 
science and politics, and epistemic and political sovereignty, are connected 
and deployed in the conduct of climate geopolitics. Such an undertaking 
can help us interrogate the processes by which global climate change issues 
are defined, and to examine how they serve to channel power in certain 
directions.
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